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Resumen
Las explicaciones tradicionales de la conducta cultural se 
fundamentan en una perspectiva seleccionista. Sin embargo, 
varias discusiones teóricas se han preguntado sobre la 
misma y sobre la identificación de unidades de selección. 
Argumentaré que, si bien las propuestas centrales de 
Glenn constituyen una extensión valiosa de los principios 
operantes, el enfoque seleccionista ha entorpecido el 
desarrollo conceptual y empírico de la teoría. Se presenta 
un examen de las nociones fundamentales de la teoría 
de la evolución cultural; específicamente, una revisión 
de los conceptos de metacontingencias, contingencias 
conductuales entrelazadas, macrocontingencias y productos 
agregados, en términos de su contribución a una explicación 
válida y significativa del comportamiento cultural. Se 
sugiere que se requieren análisis experimentales funcionales 
para identificar el control de la conducta por parte de 
contingencias individuales o grupales, incluyendo los 
productos acumulados y agregados.
Palabras clave: metacontingencia, macrocontingencia, contingencias 
entrelazadas, prácticas culturales, selección natural, selección cultural.
Abstract
Current mainstream accounts of  cultural behavior are 
strongly founded on a selectionist perspective. However, 
more than a few theoretical discussions have emerged 
regarding the appropriateness of  the subject matter and the 
identification of  units of  selection. I argue that although 
Glenn’s central formulations constitute a valuable extension 
of  operant principles, the selectionist approach has hindered 
the theory’s conceptual and empirical development. An 
examination of  the fundamental notions included in the 
theory of  cultural evolution is presented. Specifically, we 
review the concepts of  metacontingencies, interlocking 
behavioral contingencies, macrocontingencies, and 
aggregate products in terms of  their contribution to a 
valid and significant account of  cultural behavior. It is 
suggested that experimental functional analyses are required 
to identify control of  behavior by local contingencies or 
group consequences including cumulative and aggregate 
products.
Key words: metacontingency, macrocontingency, interlocking behavioral 
contingency, cultural practices, natural selection, cultural selection
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According to Skinner, the notion of  selection may be used 
to describe biological, psychological and cultural change. 
Skinner defined a culture as a set of  contingencies of  
reinforcement shaped and maintained by the members 
of  a group (Skinner, 1974; 2001). From a selectionist 
perspective, a culture is said to evolve through the practices 
that promote its survival. From this theoretical framework, 
different authors have argued that the complexity entailed 
in the analysis of  cultural phenomena justifies the 
introduction of  new concepts such as metacontingency, 
interlocking behavioral contingency, macrocontingency 
and macrobehavior (Glenn, 2004; Glenn &Malott, 2004, 
Glenn, 2010; Houmanfar, Rodrigues & Ward, 2010; Malott, 
2003). It is argued that these terms, describe functional 
relations including the interrelated behavior of  two or 
more individuals and its controlling variables. However, 
the theoretical and practical value of  these concepts has 
been debated but little consensus has been reached. 
Before further elaborations to the theory are proposed 
I consider it essential to attempt to a conceptual analysis in 
order to clarify confusions with respect to the assumptions 
on which the theory is based. This in turn, will lead to 
the construction of  a consistent theoretical system from 
which empirical investigations may be derived (Fryling& 
Hayes, 2011; Machado, Lourenco & Silva, 2000).
I propose we examine the selectionist account of  cultural 
phenomena in terms of  its validity or internal coherence, 
and its significance or the degree to which the system is 
congruent with other scientific enterprises (Kantor, 1958). 
The main goal of  this analysis is to suggest a path towards 
simplicity. The fact that the phenomenon of  interest may 
be judged as complex does not mean that the theoretical 
model used to describe it should be equally complex. 
Because an account of  cultural behavior cannot be 
provided unless a subject matter is clearly defined, the 
development of  cultural-level units (e.g., metacontingency 
and macrocontingency), requires that we simplify definitions, 
get rid of  unnecessary concepts and align theoretical 
assumptions with those of  behavioral science. In my view, 
some of  the difficulties in defining the unit of  analysis 
and the unit of  selection at the cultural level are evidenced 
when acknowledging the limitations of  using the metaphor 
of  natural selection. 
The study of  cultural entities such as organizations 
or cultural collectivities requires identifying some of  
the inconsistencies in the selectionist approach for the 
cultural phenomena, and examining the possible sources 
of  such inconsistencies. Specifically, it seems important to 
clarify: (a) what is the unit of  selection in an evolutionary 
theory of  cultural practices, (b) if  the study of  interrelated 
behavior involves a subject matter different from the one 
of  behavior science, (c) the definitions used to account for 
cultural practices of  different sorts (i.e., metacontingencies, 
macrocontingencies, interlocking behavioral contingencies, 
aggregate products, macrobehavior, etc.) and (d) the 
functional nature of  these relations. In the following pages 
I will address each of  these concerns.
Behavioral approaches to cultural phenomena: 
Some problems
The theory of  biological evolution has had a profound 
impact on psychology in general and in the field of  behavior 
analysis in particular. Namely, the logic underlying the 
process of  natural selection provided a new philosophical 
frame for the understanding of  causality relations between 
psychological events. With this new paradigm of  causality, 
the logic of  mechanistic causality derived from Newtonian 
physics was replaced (Machado, Lourenco & Silva, 2000).
In biological evolution, the theory of  natural selection 
states that the phenotypes that prevail within a given 
population, are those that contribute to its adaptation 
and reproductive success. Thus, if  some phenotypic traits 
prevail under certain environmental conditions it is because 
they have been selected. In extrapolating this logic to the 
process of  operant conditioning, Skinner (1974; 1981; 
1984) stated that behavior is selected by its consequences. 
Consequences that have survival value for the organism 
select the behaviors upon which they are contingent. As 
a result, those behaviors have a higher probability of  
occurrence under similar conditions. Similarly, at the cultural 
level the same reasoning is said to apply: the environment 
selects those practices that promote the survival and the 
well being of  the culture (Skinner, 1974). 
Further, Skinner (1974) states that there are three 
types of  survival values: the survival of  the species, 
the survival of  the organisms and the survival of  the 
cultures. Each of  these values accounts for selection 
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processes at the phylogenetic, ontogenetic and cultural 
levels, respectively. Behaviors related to each of  these 
values are maintained by contingencies of  survival and 
contingencies of  reinforcement. 
Based on these views, Glenn (1988) formulated a more 
elaborated account of  cultural evolution, which integrates 
some of  the notions of  cultural materialism (Harris, 1979, 
2007) and Skinner’s selectionist approach to the behavior of  
organisms. In this new theoretical framework the concepts 
of  interlocking behavioral contingencies, metacontingencies 
and macrocontingencies were introduced to describe 
contingency relations associated with cultural practices 
(Glenn, 1988, 2004). 
Let’s review some of  the ways in which terms have 
been used. A metacontingency is defined as a relation 
between two terms: (a) a recurring set of  coordinated 
behaviors of  two or more individuals, also called interlocking 
behavioral contingency (IBC), which results in a product, 
and (b) an environmental consequence that selects and 
maintains the IBC so that it is more likely to occur in 
the future (Glenn, 2004, 2010). As a unit that describes 
complex social environments such as organizations 
the metacontingency is defined as “a conglomerate of  
interlocking behavioral contingencies containing the 
behavior of  multiple individuals, which generates a product 
that has a demand” (Malott, 2003, p. 39). 
An interlocking behavioral contingency on the other 
hand, has been defined as a sequence of  coordinated 
behaviors of  several individuals in which any component 
of  the behavioral contingency of  one participant interacts 
with elements of  the behavioral contingency of  other 
participants (Glenn, 2004). 
Since their introduction, several points with respect 
to these two concepts have remained unclear. As a result, 
divergent interpretations have been developed generating 
a fair amount of  conceptual ambiguity. For example, there 
is currently a lack of  consensus as to whether the unit of  
analysis is interlocked behavior or interlocked contingencies 
(see Glenn, 2010; Hayes &Houmanfar, 2004; Houmanfar 
et al, 2010). In relation to this it has been discussed 
whether the level of  analysis of  cultural phenomena is 
behavioral, cultural or sociological (Branch, 2006; Glenn, 
2004, 2010; Houmanfar et al., 2010) and little consensus 
has been reached. 
Another issue that lacks sufficient clarity is the functional 
role of  the product in the metacontingency and the IBC.- 
How exactly is the product defined? -Is it functionally 
different from an environmental consequence? -Why has 
it become relevant only in the metacontingency and not 
in the behavioral contingency? 
A macrocontingency on the other hand was originally 
defined as a set of  behaviors of  different individuals that 
although individually acquired, generate a cumulative 
product that is not part of  a contingent relation with the 
behavior of  each individual (Glenn, 2004). However, a 
few other definitions have been proposed. Branch (2006) 
for example, defined macrocontingencies as individual 
contingencies applied to large numbers of  people. Ulman 
(2006) on the other hand described macrocontingencies 
as conjoint and sequential actions of  two or more 
individuals under common contingency control. In this 
view, Glenn’s metacontingency may be considered as a 
type of  macrocontingency (Ulman, 2006). 
As I see it, a behavioral analysis of  complex social 
environments won’t be possible as long as theoretical 
and empirical investigations are furthered where there 
are philosophical and conceptual inconsistencies (see 
Machado et al, 2000). Clearly, until questions are answered 
and definitions unified, the value of  these concepts for 
a cultural analysis will remain uncertain (Hobbs, 2006; 
Mattaini, 2006), and the production of  experimental 
research on metacontingencies and macrocontingencies 
will continue significantly limited. I will show that in 
general, most of  the inconsistencies result from difficulties 
with respect to: (a) the use of  the selection metaphor and 
(b) the definition of  a unit of  analysis that accounts for 
socio-cultural events. I will discuss why these issues have 
been problematic and suggest ways in which the problems 
may be overcome.
A Selectionist approach
The notion of  selection, frequently used in the social 
sciences, is a complicated one (Glenn, 2010). Scientists 
from different fields often disagree with respect to the 
ways in which the logic of  natural selection should be 
applied to the understanding of  their subject matters(see 
Hull, Langman & Glenn, 2001). Thereby, the task of  
describing how the selection process operates across 
different scientific domains and levels of  analyses is not 
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without difficulties. For example, as noted by Hull et al, 
(2001) in operant learning and cultural phenomena, selection 
occurs only with respect to sequences of  interactions; 
while in biological evolution, the process of  selection 
operates upon numerous concurrent alternatives. Because 
it is only in natural selection that several replicators are 
simultaneously available, determining the value of  the 
presently occurring behaviors relative to the not prevailing 
ones may be problematic (Houmanfar, Hayes & Fredericks, 
2001; Hull et al, 2001).
In addition, inconsistencies regarding to how the 
selection process operates at each level of  analysis are 
evidenced when testing the point-to-point correspondence 
between biological, operant and cultural evolution. When 
describing how selection accounts for patterns of  relations 
at each of  these levels, authors have sought to isolate and 
identify the interactors in the relevant event-environment 
relationships, namely, the selector, the necessary conditions 
for selection, and the unit that evolves as a result of  
the process of  natural, behavioral or cultural selection. 
Disagreements in the descriptions provided within levels 
of  analyses abound.
In biological evolution, consensus with respect to the 
primary units of  selection has not been reached. While 
Dawkins (2008) contends that the units of  selection are 
genes, in Mayr’s view (1997), the units of  selection are 
organisms. At the ontogenetic level of  analysis the unit 
of  selection is the operant (Hayes &Houmanfar, 2004) or 
in Glenn’s (2004, 2010), terms response lineages, while in 
cultural evolution, authors have proposed a variety of  views. 
The subject of  cultural selection has been identified as the 
practices of  the group (Skinner, 1974), the IBCs and the 
aggregate product (Houmanfar & Rodrigues, 2006 Malott, 
2003; Glenn, 2004; Glenn & Malott, 2004).
Further problems arise when the rest of  the elements 
that complete the selection process have to be articulated 
into a coherent description. The agent of  selection for the 
above identified selection units at all three levels is the 
environment. However, while in operant conditioning, the 
selector is clearly defined as a reinforcing consequence, 
in cultural evolution the environment has been identified 
as the receiving system (Glenn & Malott, 2004), as the 
product of  interrelated behavior (Malott & Glenn, 2006), 
and as consequence, external to the IBC´s and its product 
(Glenn, 2010). 
Continuing with the parallel, in cultural evolution a 
selection process is said to have occurred if  it results in 
the success of  the group. According to Skinner, a culture 
evolves when practices of  individuals contribute to the 
success of  the group in solving its problems (Skinner, 1974, 
1981); but what determines the success of  the group has 
not been clearly specified (Mattaini, 2006). Recent accounts 
applied specifically to the evolution of  organizations have 
replaced the success of  the organization as the evidence 
of  selection, by the generation of  a satisfactory product 
(Malott & Glenn, 2006; Houmanfar & Rodrigues, 2006). 
However it is not clear if  and how a satisfactory product 
is related to the success of  the group.
Finally, the entity that evolves as a result of  the selection 
process is the species, and response lineages in biology 
and psychology respectively. In cultural selection different 
entities have been proposed. Thus, according to some 
authors, what evolves as a result of  selection are the IBCs or 
cultural-behavioral lineages (Glenn, 2004; Glenn & Malott, 
2004), and according to others it is the organization/culture 
as a whole (Houmanfar & Rodrigues, 2006).
Notice that in individual and cultural selection the unit 
of  selection and the evolving entity happens to coincide 
(operants/IBC`s/the organization). In other words, what is 
selected is the same thing as that which evolves as a result 
of  the process. By contrast, in natural selection, what are 
selected are genotypes or phenotypes and what evolves 
are the species or populations. 
As I have briefly shown, the metaphor of  selection has 
been used to describe how different subject matters are 
related to their particular contexts. Within each particular 
domain, alternative formulations of  how selection occurs, 
and what elements are involved in the process seem to vary 
according to vantage points, interpretations, and theoretical 
bias. The paradigm of  selection has been used as a discourse 
applicable to any arrangement of  event-environment relations. 
Its practical value for the understanding of  the variables that 
allow for prediction and control of  subject matters in different 
domains is questionable if  using the analogy results in a level of  
conceptual confusion that threatens theoretical formulations.
Is the selection metaphor really useful?
Darwin introduced the notion of  natural selection as 
a metaphor to explain how a great variety of  species 
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evolved from a few common ancestors. To review, his 
theory states that certain phenotypes produced by random 
mutations in the gene-pool, become more prevalent within 
a population, given their contribution to the adaptiveness 
of  organisms having those traits. In a continuously 
challenging environment, the likelihood of  survival and 
hence of  reproductive success is increased in some of  
those genetically changed organisms only. A laboratory 
experiment could show the evolutionary process if  in 
place of  natural variation and mutation, an experimenter 
artificially produced these genetic mutations and put them to 
the test with also designed particular environmental threats. 
In a context were religious notions were dominant and 
a superior intelligence was thought to be responsible for 
the existence of  all things, naturalistic postulations were 
difficult to understand. Although Darwin illustrated the 
evolutionary process using examples of  artificial (man-
produced) selection, he was careful to highlight the absence 
of  an intentional design that produced those mutations 
thereby guiding the process of  speciation in particular ways. 
With no experimenter deliberately producing environmental 
threats or changes in the anatomy of  organisms, the process 
was described as a type of  design without a designer, or 
natural selection.
The notion of  selection refers to a process and an 
outcome. However, in its original formulation the concept 
was used as a metaphorical extension in which causal 
relations between agents and subjects of  selection where 
used to explain the prevalence of  some phenotypes among 
others. 
Throughout the development of  sciences, the metaphor 
of  natural selection has been used to account for processes 
relative to different disciplines (e.g., behavioral psychology, 
cognitive neurosciences, cultural materialism, systems 
analysis, and sociology). Metaphors are useful when 
a complete account of  the phenomenon under study 
has not been reached, or as an instrument to facilitate 
the understanding of  abstract concepts by using more 
familiar ones. 
Although the knowledge brought about by the use of  
a metaphor may throw some light on the phenomenon 
under investigation, conceptual problems arise when 
most or all of  the characteristics of  the original event are 
extrapolated to those of  the subject matter being explained 
by means of  the metaphor. Unfortunately, the risk of  
doing so is particularly high given that the practical validity 
of  the metaphor increases as a function of  the number 
of  elements susceptible to extrapolation. Therefore, in 
attempting to increase the comparability of  the two events 
(and thus, the value of  the metaphor), the probability of  
making erroneous assumptions increases and the value of  
the metaphor may be as a result, undermined. 
The use of  natural selection as a metaphor to provide 
a philosophical and theoretical foundation for psychology 
and other related disciplines has had an ill impact on the 
consistency of  its theoretical, conceptual and investigative 
systems and it has originated and maintained unnecessary 
controversies within other scientific fields. 
Both behavior analysis and Behavioral Systems Analysis, 
have been concerned with finding an appropriate fit between 
the assumptions pertaining to their subject matter and 
those of  natural selection. Significant time and effort has 
been invested in trying to reach a consensus with respect to 
the identification of  the units of  selection, the conditions 
under which selection occurs, and the entities that evolve 
as a result of  selection. Further, because there is more 
than one approach to evolutionary theory, the proposed 
parallels between biological and other types of  selection 
often reveal a muddle of  philosophical assumptions. 
Theoretical discomfort is often solved, by relaxing the 
boundaries of  conceptual precision. The result, a gain 
in generality at the expense of  accuracy, diminishes the 
validity and significance of  the scientific account.
Not few conceptual and theoretical problems in 
psychology have arisen from the inclusion of  metaphors and 
borrowed terms (from other disciplines or from colloquial 
language) as conceptual categories in our scientific system. 
Although historically behavior scientists have criticized the 
use of  this practice by other psychological approaches, it is 
not foreign within the behavior analytic literature. Borrowed 
from physiology, the concepts of  stimuli and responses 
have implied a characterization of  psychological events in 
terms of  categories pertaining to biological events. Similarly, 
theoretical formulations such as behavioral momentum 
and behavioral economics are described using a conceptual 
logic originated in other disciplines.
Some of  the terminology from evolutionary theory is 
now commonly used in operant conditioning descriptions. 
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Terms such as response lineages, cultural lineages (Glenn, 
2004), populationsof  responses (Hull et al; 2001), and 
replicators (Glenn, 2004, Glenn & Madden, 1995; Hull, 
et al., 2001; Malott & Glenn, 2006), are often used in 
selectionists models of  cultural behavior. In my view, if  
the concepts generated within a discipline sufficiently 
account for their referents, the introduction of  borrowed 
or new terminology is hardly justified. 
Skinner used the metaphor of  natural selection to explain 
that behavior- environment relations are functional and not 
causal in a mechanistic sense (Chiesa, 1994). Unfortunately, 
where the importance of  this new kind of  causality (to 
use Skinner’s terms) is neglected, mechanistic worldviews 
continue to predominate in behavioral formulations. 
Descriptions of  functional relations in terms of  linear 
temporal sequences that suggest a mechanistic causality 
(antecedents, behavior, consequences) are not uncommon 
in applied behavior analysis (Fryling & Hayes, 2011). 
Nevertheless, and regardless of  the causal philosophical 
assumptions adopted, the selection metaphor continues 
to be used with an increasing number of  terms from 
evolutionary theories.
 The root metaphor of  the mechanistic perspective 
is the machine and the functioning of  its parts, having a 
specific location in space and time (Pepper, 1970). Thereby, 
identifying agents of  replication, agents of  selection, subjects 
of  selection, etc. (see Glenn, 2004, Malott & Glenn, 2006) 
is consistent with the mechanistic goal of  identifying loci 
of  action. From the worldview of  functional contextualism, 
behavior- environment relations are best understood as 
functions in a mathematical sense of  the term (see Fryling 
& Hayes 2011). Thus, concepts such as stimulus and 
environment do not correspond to certain objects or events 
occurring before or after a point of  reference, or being 
external or internal with respect to that point. Specified 
reinforcers, EOs or discriminative stimuli in models of  
cultural phenomena prior to experimental evaluation, is 
not consistent with the logic of  a functional analysis but 
with the logic of  a mechanistic, linear philosophy (see for 
example Houmanfar et al., 2010). 
 Glenn described the metacontingency as a kind of  
selection, that is to say, a contingency relation between 
a set of  interlocking behavioral contingencies (and its 
aggregate product) and a consequence (Glenn, 2004; 2010). 
Before complex models involving contingencies of  more 
than two terms may be considered (e.g., Houmanfar et 
al., 2010) systematic empirical research examining simple 
IBC-environment relations needs to be conducted (e.g., 
Vichi, Andery & Glenn, 2009).
In my opinion, the value of  the selection metaphor in 
an account of  behavioral/cultural phenomena remains 
debatable. The availability of  tacting terms for contingency 
relations (whether the unit is molar as in IBCs, or molecular 
as the behavior of  single organisms) without reference to 
the terminology used in evolutionary theories, render the 
use of  this terminology unnecessary.
In addition, because the metaphor is problematic even 
in gene-based accounts, developing a consistent selectionist 
account of  cultural phenomena may be theoretically fruitless 
and empirically impractical. The conceptual struggles 
generated by selectionism may be avoided by investigating 
cultural phenomena using the conceptual repertoire of  a 
functional analysis of  behavior. 
An appropriate unit of analysis
Having set aside the discussion regarding what is selected 
and what is not, we now turn to the second source of  
controversy: identifying the subject matter in a culturo-
behavioral analysis. We will also examine the adequacy of  
the current conceptual system by revisiting the notions 
of  macrocontingencies, metacontingencies, aggregate 
products, and interlocking behavioral contingencies. I 
will discuss the coherence and utility of  these terms and 
propose that only the simplest definitions be maintained. 
With respect to the subject matter or unit of  analysis 
appropriate for the study of  cultural practices, a few 
questions come to my mind: should behavior analysts be 
concerned with cultural phenomena? Does this interest lie 
outside the boundaries of  our subject matter? Because the 
subject matter of  behavior science is the behavior of  single 
organisms with respect to stimulating environments, the 
ways in which cultural events may be approached from a 
behavior analytic perspective have not been altogether clear 
(Houmanfar& Rodrigues, 2006; Malott & Glenn, 2006).
The study of  human behavior is also the study of  
cultural behavior. As Kantor (1982) asserts it is difficult 
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to differentiate between cultural behavior and non-cultural 
human behavior. I Therefore, not all human behavior is 
cultural behavior, the latter may be conceptualized as a 
category, which includes all instances of  human behavior 
that are not shared with non-human animals. 
The culture however, may be construed as an event, 
independent from the interrelated behaviors of  its 
members, and individual behavior may be understood as 
the substrate of  cultural practices (Glenn, 1988; 1991). 
Although controversial, the notion of  emergence has 
been used to describe interrelations of  events across levels 
of  analysis. Thus, a culture is said to emerge from the 
interrelated behavior of  individuals just as behavior may 
be considered to emerge from physiological activity. Even 
though a new unit of  analysis or subject matter emerges 
from processes at other levels of  analysis, events at more 
molar levels are not reducible to events at more molecular 
levels (Houmanfar & Rodriguez, 2006; Houmanfar et al., 
2010). Specifically, cultural events cannot be reduced to 
psychological events (Glenn, 2004; Houmanfar & Rodrigues, 
2006) and psychological events are not reducible to 
physiological events. Each level constitutes an independent 
scientific domain wherein the conceptual categories and 
methods used to describe a subject matter cannot be used 
to describe units pertaining to a different level.
Although most would agree with the above statements, 
an interest in studying interrelationships between the 
science of  contingency relations and cultural phenomena 
has remained (Ulman, 2006). Attempts at this aim have 
involved applying the logic of  the operant contingency 
for the description of  complex relations in societies and 
organizations. However, if  cultural phenomena cannot be 
reduced to the interrelated behavior of  its members, how 
could a behavioral analysis be achieved?.
Because of  the multiplicity of  variables involved in 
the study of  complex systems such as organized social 
environments some authors considered useful integrating 
some of  the assumptions from general systems theory 
with those of  behavior analysis. Initially, the Behavioral 
Systems Analysis (BSA) perspective focused on three units 
of  analysis: the system as a whole, the metacontingency, 
and the behavioral contingency (Malott, 2003). BSA’s main 
objective is the analysis of  complex systems in general, 
and organizations in particular. However, describing 
the behavioral relations that take place in that system is 
considered a crucial aspect in the understanding of  the 
system as a whole. 
From a BSA perspective, an organization is a system 
comprised of  a network of  interrelations among 
its constituent elements or a network of  interlocking 
behavioral contingencies. This view emphasizes targeting the 
interdependent relations among the parts or subsystems of  
the organization, rather than the behavior of  each individual 
member (Malott & Martinez, 2006). It contends that the 
analysis of  the variables controlling individual behaviors 
seems to fall short of  an accurate account of  the potential 
problems of  an organization given its complexity. This logic 
corresponds to a molar view in which units of  analysis 
constitute composites of  simpler elements, and units of  
measurements and observation comprise larger time scales. 
Establishing a unit of  analysis that reflects BSA’s main 
objectives (i.e., the analysis of  complex systems in general, 
and organizations in particular), and remains coherent with 
the basic tenets of  behavior science has been a challenging 
task. In addition, manipulating consequences involving 
markets, consumers, the society, etc (the receiving system) 
may be problematic. In general, it is not clear how entire 
organizations or societies could be subject to procedures 
that involve observation and data recording for purposes 
of  conducting experimental analyses (Ulman, 2006). 
The confusion between levels and units of  analysis is 
eliminated when we remain at the individual/behavioral 
level. From this standpoint we can describe and manipulate 
contingencies to show orderly patterns in the behavior 
of  individuals and their interactions (Marr, 2006), we 
can observe interrelated behavior in IBCs, as well as the 
recurrence of  these IBCs over time, and we can manipulate 
consequences in order to accurate determine controlling 
variables (Branch, 2006; Vichi, Andery& Glenn, 2009). 
A behavioral analysis of  cultural phenomena should not 
entail adopting a new subject matter or unit of  analysis 
or changing the set of  assumptions on which behavior 
science rests. Psychology is concerned with responses 
of  individuals to stimuli, which we may be characterized 
as cultural whereas the study of  interactions of  groups-
environment interactions corresponds to the domain of  
sociology (Houmanfar et al, 2001; Kantor, 1982; Vargas, 
1985).
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An examination of terms: 
Contingencies within contingencies
Thus far I have suggested that in studying cultural behavior, 
we keep the analysis behavioral and analytical (see Baer, 
Wolf  & Risley, 1968), and focus on the contingencies 
accounting for the interrelated behavior of  individuals 
without reference to a selectionist terminology. The 
notions of  IBC, metacontingency, macrocontingency 
and macrobehavior, have been proposed to describe the 
occurrence of  behavior patterns among members of  a 
group. I will review the definitions of  these concepts 
and examine their utility for a science of  behavior. For 
this purpose it is important to determine if  the processes 
these concepts describe can be fully explained by already 
existing concepts or principles. The use of  the constructs 
will be justified to the extent that they refer to new types 
of  interactions characterizing cultural events.
Metacontigencies and IBCs
As defined by Malott (2003) an interlocking behavioral 
contingency involves an interaction of  two or more 
individuals. In this interaction, any element of  an individual 
behavioral contingency functions as an environmental 
event for the behavior of  another individual. More simply 
stated, an interlocking behavioral contingency is a set 
of  interrelated behaviors of  several individuals, which 
often results in an aggregate product. As in the case of  
a behavioral chain or a complex operant, we could say 
that all the behaviors in the IBC are part of  the same 
operant class. In the IBC the behavior of  each individual 
is shaped and maintained by conditioned reinforcers (any 
element of  the individual contingency), and ultimately, by 
a terminal reinforcer. 
A molar perspective would not require identifying the 
controlling variables accounting for each single occurrence 
of  behavior, only the consequence maintaining the whole 
set of  coordinated behaviors. This corresponds to Glenn’s 
(2010) notion of  a metacontingency (recurrent IBCs 
maintained by a consequence). Notice that as the terminal 
reinforcer is contingent upon the behavior of  all the group 
members, each individual behavior could be maintained 
by that consequence. This could be evaluated by arranging 
a circumstance where the behavior of  only one of  the 
members of  the group is prevented from contacting the 
contingency. If  behavior rate decreases to operant levels 
(possibly affecting the recurrence of  the interlocking 
behavioral contingency), then the terminal reinforcer may 
be controlling individual behavior more strongly than the 
local components of  the interlocked contingency. Control 
by immediate contingencies rather than by the consequence 
of  the IBC would be demonstrated if  behavior rate 
remained unaltered. 
The classical example is an assembly line. All members 
of  an assembly line engage in behavior that we may call 
collaborative: it is due to their conjoint performances 
that a product or consequence follows. If  each member 
receives a paycheck contingent on the completion of  the 
aggregate product, each individual behavior could be 
sufficiently described in terms of  an individual operant 
contingency. If  a member of  the group continued to 
participate in the chain without receiving a paycheck, the 
maintaining variables for the behavior of  that participant 
would need to be identified. Another useful example, also 
mentioned by Glenn (2010) is the coordinated behaviors 
of  the members of  a football team. Winning a game 
shapes and maintains the behavior of  each of  the members 
of  the team as the consequence is contingent upon the 
behavior of  all the members of  the group. As illustrated 
in these examples, the consequences may be of  two types: 
immediate (conditioned reinforcers), or remote (terminal 
reinforcers). Identifying predominant control by one type 
of  consequence above the other constitutes an empirical 
question and should be assessed and not merely assumed. 
At any rate, a sequential IBC could be viewed as an 
analog of  a behavioral chain in which components are 
responses of  different individuals in a group. This difference 
alone may be enough to justify the introduction of  the 
notions of  IBC and metacontingency. The analysis of  such 
coordinated behavior could be molar, molecular, or both 
if  the goal is a more accurate functional assessment. While 
a molecular analysis targets the individual contingency, a 
molar one targets the metacontingency i.e., the relation 
that specifies the recurrence of  IBCs over time, and its 
controlling variables (Glenn, 2010). The metacontingency 
allows for the prediction and control of  the behavior of  
a single individual with respect to a social environment, 
and of  the interrelated behaviors of  the group.
It is also important to clarify the role of  the product of  
the IBC and how it differs functionally from its consequence 
as a maintaining variable. Glenn (2010) parallels the product 
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of  the IBC in the metacontingency to the closing of  a 
switch after a lever press, in the operant contingency. 
However, the product of  behavior is not often considered 
in a functional analysis unless it alters behavior probability. 
In fact, not all behavior results in a product, and the same 
may be true in the case of  the metacontingency. If  an IBC 
does result in a product, its functional properties need to 
be identified. Applied and basic experimental research on 
IBCs and the metacontingencies needs to be conducted 
to provide empirical support for these notions. Until a 
consistent pool of  data is obtained, research questions 
should focus on models involving the two-term contingency 
only (Glenn, 2010).
Macrocontingencies
In a metacontingency, different topographies are emitted 
by individuals participating in an IBC. However in some 
other cases several individuals in a group may emit the same 
topography. There are two possibilities for the last scenario: 
(a) the same consequence maintains the behavior of  each 
individual in the group, and (b) individual behavior is acquired 
and maintained by independent individual contingencies. 
The former case is a description of  a group contingency; 
the latter corresponds to Glenn’s (2004) definition of  a 
macrocontingency. Related to the macrocontingency is the 
term macro-behavior, which is defined as the behaviors of  
many individuals having similar topographies that produce 
an effect at the level of  the culture (Glenn, 2004). 
In the macrocontingency the aggregate sum of  all the 
consequences constitutes a different outcome that cannot 
be produced by each individual behavior. Interestingly 
though, this cumulative effect is not part of  a contingent 
relation with any individual behavior. It is important to 
notice that in the absence of  a contingent relation between 
behavior and consequence the term macro-contingency 
is hardly justified. In addition, it is not clear how the 
introduction of  the term macrobehavior could be useful 
for purposes of  application or description. If, as specified 
in the definition of  macrocontingencies, the maintaining 
consequences are different for each individual behavior, 
the topographies would not be part of  the same operant 
class and therefore, the notion of  macro-behavior could 
not be used.
Behaviors such as smoking, overeating or contaminating 
the environment are described as examples of  
macrocontingencies. Presumably, they are acquired and 
maintained by different and independent individual 
contingencies. Nonetheless, when emitted by several 
individuals, such behaviors result in a consequence, which 
is the cumulative product of  the non-related behaviors of  
the group members (Glenn, 2004). 
Macrocontingencies differ from metacontingencies 
in the following fundamental aspects; (a) behaviors in 
macrocontingencies are not transmitted inter-individually; 
(b) the behavior of  one individual does not depend on, 
or is related to the behavior others, (c) the behavior of  
individuals in the group is not oriented towards a common 
goal, and (d) the cumulative product of  macrocontingencies 
does not have an effect on individual behaviors. We will 
now discuss which social practices conform to these 
characteristics.
I will make the case that in most examples of  
macrocontingencies behaviors are transmitted 
interindividually. For example, many social practices are 
acquired, learned and transmitted through observational 
learning. This is illustrated by Kawai’s (1965) research cited 
by Pierce and Cheney (2004): 
“The researchers had spread grains of  wheat in a 
sandy beach that the monkeys often visited. Each monkey 
picked the grains from the sand and ate them one at a 
time. Then a young monkey learned to separate the sand 
from the wheat more efficiently by tossing a handful of  
mixture into the water. When this happened the sand sank 
to the bottom and the wheat floated to the top. Using this 
technique the monkey obtained more wheat with less effort. 
Other members of  the troop observed this behavior and 
were soon imitating this new method of  feeding. Kawai 
indicated that observational learning transmitted many 
other novel behaviors, including washing the sand off  
of  sweet potatoes and swimming in the ocean”(Pierce & 
Cheney, 2004, p. 297).
Behaviors such as feeding or harvesting may be controlled 
by individual contingencies as well as by the additive effect 
generated by the behaviors of  several individuals. The 
example above shows that the practice that led to a more 
effective way of  feeding was in fact “transmitted” inter-
individually. An organism imitates another’s behavior 
because it is likely that the same consequences will follow 
(Skinner, 1974). 
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The same could be argued in the case of  cultures. 
Although the time-span in which similar behaviors may 
occur is much larger and variable than in the case of  
non-human animals, the requisite of  spatial and temporal 
contiguity that characterizes contingency relations is 
transcended by the acquisition of  a verbal repertoire. 
Further, accessibility to information through technology 
facilitates contact with a large range of  cultural practices 
that are susceptible to be imitated if  the consequences 
constitute sources of  reinforcement. Smoking, obesity or 
unsafe sexual practices leading to epidemics in a population 
may be explained in a similar manner. If  the consequence 
of  a teenager’s smoking behavior is peer acceptance, any 
other member of  the group is likely to be susceptible to 
the same source of  reinforcement. 
Obesity may be the result of  the way the physical 
environment is arranged. If  a particular population has 
easy access to food and if, most of  this food is high in 
caloric value, this population would tend to be obese 
compared to others living under different conditions. 
However, overeating may also involve interrelated behavior, 
e.g., when a child learns unhealthy eating habits from his 
parents through observational learning, or when eating 
is functionally related to a social consequence (eating, 
drinking and smoking are usually settings in which social 
interactions occur). From this perspective social practices 
(not just those accounted for by metacontingencies), entail 
interrelated behavior. Behaviors such as smoking, drinking, 
overeating, etc., are the result of  social contingencies; as 
such, they are acquired inter-individually. 
Another suggested difference between a macrocontingency 
and an interlocking behavioral contingency is that in the 
latter, the behaviors of  all individuals are intentionally 
coordinated, such that they result in a product. However, 
goal orientation or intentionality in behavior science, refer 
to control by rules describing, the contingency between the 
consequence and/or product, and coordinated behavior. 
Therefore is no reason to assert that IBCs are goal oriented 
while other social types of  social behavior are not. 
Finally, I contend that the cumulative product of  social 
practices does affect individual behavior. Cumulative 
outcomes such as contamination, violence, crime, problems 
of  public health, or even traffic at rush hour, constitute 
sources of  stimulation that may exert consequential 
control on future behavior probability. The corresponding 
rules specifying those contingencies may also function as 
discriminative/delta stimuli altering behavior probability. 
Foxal´s (1999, 2001) Behavioral Perspective Model for 
example includes consequential control by symbolic (i.e., 
socially attributed) properties of  stimuli as an important 
variable in the prediction of  consumer´s behavior.
Summing up, the metacontingency and the 
macrocontingency describe relations that allow for 
the prediction and control of  behavior with respect 
to social environments. Three types of  contingencies 
may be differentiated: (a) the metacontingency, (b) the 
macrocontingency, and (c) group contingencies. However, 
if  we agree that the cumulative product does exert control 
over behavior, it seems impractical and unnecessary to 
differentiate between macrocontingencies and group 
contingencies. As in the case of  metacontingencies, 
individual contingencies or cumulative outcomes may 
exert differential control on behavior. 
Discussion
Confusions raised by the identification of  units of  analysis 
and units of  selection may be solved by approaching the 
study of  cultural phenomena from a behavioral perspective. 
This implies that the formulation of  theoretical models 
must be consistent with the philosophical assumptions 
of  radical behaviorism, and that the subject matter does 
not need to be questioned. Cultural behavior is not 
different from other types of  behavior to the extent that 
a new subject matter and a new discipline are required to 
account for cultural practices in a comprehensive manner. 
As behavior analysts we are interested in the analysis of  
human behavior and, as human behavior is mostly (if  
not entirely) cultural, interrelated behavior is itself  our 
dependent variable and subject matter. 
Skinner (1981, 1984) paralleled operant conditioning 
with natural selection to stress that in a functional analysis, 
a mechanistic type of  causality does not adequately 
describe relations among events. However, selectionism 
has come to acquire a predominant role in our verbal 
repertoire. Formulations are accommodated to the logic and 
terminology of  natural selection, even if  their philosophical 
assumptions seem more consistent with a mechanistic 
type of  causality. In my opinion, the analogy with natural 
selection has added little to a theoretical account of  cultural 
behavior. On the contrary, it has constituted a source of  
23
The Selection Metaphor
Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología Volumen 44 No 1 pp. 13-24 2012 ISSN 0120-0534
unnecessary conceptual confusion that may have slowed the 
progress in the understanding of  complex phenomena by 
creating a significant amount of  controversy while hindering 
empirical research. Sciences and technologies should be 
cautious when introducing constructs as part of  developing 
theoretical formulations. Scientific explanations should 
strive for economy and simplicity, and avoid redundancy 
and rhetorical intricacies. 
An examination of  some of  the concepts used in 
behavioral analyses of  cultural phenomena suggests that 
macro-contingencies may not differ substantially from 
the group of  contingencies. I contend that the cumulative 
product may have an effect on individual behavior, and 
that a completely separate and independent acquisition 
of  each behavior is arguable. Similarly, in a contingency 
group a common consequence is contingent upon the 
behaviors of  the members of  the group (Cooper, Heron 
& Heward, 2007).
Consequences of  the interrelated behavior of  all the 
members of  a group may have reinforcing or punishing 
functions; and this applies equally to metacontingencies and 
group contingencies. In both types of  cultural contingencies, 
behaviors may be controlled by individual and/or by group 
consequences, which may include cumulative effects, or 
aggregate products of  recurrent IBCs. Group contingencies 
however involve similar topographies under common 
contingency control. By contrast, metacontingencies 
describe consequential control over IBCs which in turn, 
refer to the coordinated different topographies of  the 
members of  a group. As such, IBCs may be construed as 
an operant class. 
Empirical research on metacontigencies and the design 
of  cultural practices should begin by addressing the two-
term relations involved in metacontingencies before more 
complex models are proposed (Glenn, 2010). As Glenn 
(2004) asserts, the effects of  the added behaviors of  several 
individuals are relevant for the well-being of  the culture. 
Many of  the problems that threaten the well-being of  
cultures are cumulative effects of  this sort. Smoking, drug 
addiction, alcoholism and obesity are the result of  practices 
that require a re-design of  cultural-behavioral contingencies. 
Smaller-scale research projects may target some of  these 
social phenomena in small groups or communities.
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